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Making Embedded Knowledge Transparent: How the V-Dem Dataset Opens New Vistas in Civil Society 
Research 
 
In this article we discuss the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Civil Society data, a new and 
unparalleled resource that captures multiple dimensions of civil society across over 170 states since 
1900. The value-added of the V-Dem civil society data, that it encompasses diverse indicators over an 
unprecedented geographic and temporal scope, is possible because it has taken a store of detailed and 
rich human knowledge -- the embedded knowledge of country experts -- and transformed it into 
comparable time-series cross-sectional data that facilitates new forms of descriptive and theoretical 
inference. 
Here we make prominent use of three new variables that allow us to gauge civil society strength 
and participation. However, the larger dataset allows researchers to track a range of new variables for 
many other aspects of civil society that heretofore, despite their relevance to important theoretical 
questions, have been difficult to gauge. These include concepts such as the degree to which decision- 
makers consult with civil society actors, the presence and nature of anti-system movements, state 
harassment and regulation of civil society organizations, the predominant organizational pattern of civil 
society organizations, and the degree to which civil society excludes both female and religious actors.1 
We begin with a discussion of the importance of civil society as a relatively new concept in 
comparative politics and the difficulty of testing general propositions about it due to the existing data 
environment. We then discuss the data generally and highlight two mid-range indices developed by V- 
Dem, the Core Civil Society Index (CCSI) and the Civil Society Participation Index (CSPI). With these basics 
established, we then report on a series of validity tests for the CCSI which demonstrates the level of 
dense historical nuance that the V-Dem data embodies, and then demonstrates the utility of the data by 
revisiting the debate on the strength of postcommunist civil society. The V-Dem data shows that civil 
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society in the region exhibits a great deal of variation, that it is neither universally strong nor weak, and 
that greater caution is warranted in generalizing about civil society in the postcommunist region. 
The Emergence of Civil Society as a Key Concept in Comparative Politics 
 
Civil society has been an important concept in both political theory and the study of regimes and 
regime change in modern political science. It played a critical role in the conceptualization of modern 
society in the political thought of the Scottish Enlightenment2 and German Idealism.3  It has also received 
a great deal of attention in contemporary critical theory.4 However, in many regards the notion of civil 
society that we employ in political science today has two parents, the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci5 
and the French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville.6 From Gramsci we continue to think of civil society as a 
realm of contestation, where organized social actors challenge the power of the state and other social 
forces. From Tocqueville we draw the notion that civil society is the integument of democracy. Instead 
of stoking reactionary nightmares of democracy as mob rule, Tocqueville explored how an engaged and 
organized citizenry enables more egalitarian, mass-based forms of rule. 
In modern comparative politics civil society reemerged as a central concept of analysis in the 
1980s to describe the reemergence of protest movements and underground organizations under 
authoritarian regimes. This analysis is neo-Gramscian in nature, in that it sees civil society as an 
emergent realm of contestation with dictatorship. What was novel about this approach was that civil 
society was posited to coexist with authoritarian regimes and that this held the potential to liberalize, if 
not democratize them. Among the earliest and most influential in this regard was Alfred Stepan who 
observed such development first-hand in Brazil in its resistance to military dictatorship.7 In Eastern 
Europe, Andrew Arato made similar observations on the emergence of new oppositional social actors as 
the impetus for change in state socialist regimes.8 This observation was significant because the essence 
of the state-socialist project was the abolition of civil society.9 
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With the third wave of democratization this neo-Gramscian notion of a contentious civil society 
was integrated into influential actor-centered process models of democratic transition. O’Donnell and 
Schmitter refer to the response of social actors to new opportunities opened up by liberalization as “the 
exploding layers of society.”10 Such mobilization is a decisive factor in the extension of liberalization into 
democratic transition. Przeworski takes this further, pinpointing whether civil society accepts the 
liberalization of constraints on speech and organization or whether it presses for further concessions as 
the key juncture in democratic transition.11 
The neo-Tocquevillian notion of civil society drew its inspiration from the study of mass political 
behavior and consideration of the forms of political culture most congruent with democracy. This line of 
reasoning was opened by Almond and Verba12 who saw an expansive layer of activist citizenry as central 
to democracy and was advanced by Putnam,13 whose account of civic participation and government 
performance across Italy placed associational life at the center of the forms of social capital necessary 
for effective governance. Inglehart and his collaborators14 have linked a complex of values including 
citizen-level engagement with pro-democratic political cultures. While such foundational accounts of 
democratic political culture did not explicitly conceptualize this in terms of civil society, it has been 
recognized as such by others.15 
While there has been widespread adoption and acceptance of neo-Gramscian notions of an 
“insurgent civil society” as a fundamental actor in contemporary democratization and a neo- 
Tocquevillian notion of a “regularized civil society of social interests” as a critical sphere in durable 
democracy, there have also been a number of dissenting views. Several accounts have disputed the 
notion of cultural congruence with democracy, arguing that the causal relationship is inverted and that 
social trust and citizen engagement is less central to democratic success than theorized.16 Others raise 
the specter of an activist civil society as a means for authoritarian mass movements to overthrow 
democracy.17 
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The notion of a badly behaved and overactive civil society contradicts the idea that civil society 
mobilization is an essential element in overcoming the inertia of authoritarianism. Such controversies 
find strong echo in the literature on postcommunist democratization where one set of scholars pose the 
problem of “weak” civil society as problematic for the building of durable democracy,18 whereas as 
others have seen an active and engaged civil society as an mechanism for democratic consolidation19 or 
as an essential component of defeating neo-authoritarian challenges to full democratization.20 
Our ability to settle such fundamental questions have been to some degree impeded because 
the data at our disposal is limited. Theories are advocated and refuted on the basis of a relatively small 
number of cases, by cross-sectional data that cannot capture the full political dynamics of such 
relationships, constrained samples which lead to concerns about bias on the basis of what has been 
omitted, or different sources that present different assessments of fundamental qualities. The V-Dem 
data goes a long way in remedying such problems by collecting data that was previously understood as 
too expensive to collect or even unobservable. The team has been able to do this by accessing the 
“embedded knowledge” of experts and render it visible for researchers. This represents a step forward 
in addressing many thorny, unresolved research questions. For instance, the literature on the strength 
of postcommunist civil society and it ramifications lacks a consensus on whether civil society in the 
region is weak or developed. We will return to this particular question later in the article, but before 
that it is worthwhile to document the state of the data environment prior to the publication of the new 
V-Dem data. 
The Existing Data Environment 
 
Data to measure civil society, until now, has been difficult to collect and apply in cross-national 
analysis. The discussion that follows introduces the extant indicators and their limitations for doing 
time-series, cross-sectional type analysis. This is in no way meant to diminish the importance of the 
work of these authors, their measures, or the analyses based on them. Following this discussion, we 
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then discuss the potential liabilities that data-poor environments can pose for making generalizable 
inference. 
The most common measurement of civil society uses questions from the World Values Survey 
(WVS) on organizational and protest behavior. WVS and the various regional surveys and attitudinal 
barometers it has inspired are a major resource in the study of political culture. The surveys have now 
been conducted for over thirty years in six waves and have included as many as 50-60 countries in 
individual waves.21 However, the WVS is only repeated every five years due to resource constraints, 
alternates two different questions on organizational behavior, and does not always include the same 
countries, posing major challenges for studying civil society in any sort of panel or country-year set-up 
for a global sample. 
Event history coding of protest is also an important means to study the development of civil 
societies in a small number of contexts over time. Such coding is very difficult and expensive to replicate 
over a large number of countries. The most extensive, ambitious, and sustained project of this sort has 
compiled annual data for four countries over a thirty year period.22 Some have also examined the 
registration of new organizations from statistical annuals or registries on a national level but these 
figures are limited in that they do not track exit or activism, and are hard to collect in comparable terms 
across countries.23 
Several organizations have tried to remedy these problems by measuring different components 
across civil societies. One of the most ambitious is the Civicus Civil Society Index that looked at four 
different dimensions of civil society -- “the organisational structure of civil society, civic engagement, 
perception of impact, practice of values and the enabling environment.”24 The most recent Civicus CSI 
round covered 35 countries for the period 2008-11.25 Work on this measure has been suspended and 
has been replaced by the Civicus Civil Society Enabling Environment Index or EEI.26 
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The EEI measures the “conditions that impact on the capacity of citizens… to participate and 
engage in the civil society arena in a sustained and voluntary manner.” The first report issued in 2013 
included 108 countries. The measure is composed of 53 indicators compiled over the period from 2005- 
2012, which capture three major dimensions (socio-economic, socio-cultural, and governance) broken 
into 17 sub-dimensions. While very ambitious in scope and useful for policy-makers and activists, this 
measure, by its nature, has limited utility for statistical investigation except in basic cross-sectional 
analysis.27 
Two different organizations compiled a Global Civil Society Index. In 2002 the Center for the 
Study of Global Governance at the London School of Economics published rankings for 33 countries in 
Europe and the Americas circa 200028  and the Center for Civil Society Studies at Johns Hopkins 
University published an index for sixteen countries also around 2000.29 Disaggregated components were 
compiled for thirty-six countries in an updated version.30 
USAID’s Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (CSOSI) examines six dimensions -- the 
legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure, 
and public image -- and ranks them on a scale from one to five. The CSOSI is an average of the 
components. They have compiled the index for postcommunist Europe for the years 1997-2011 and for 
twenty countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2009-2011.31 
Freedom House’s Nations in Transit32 also calculates a civil society score for the postcommunist 
countries. It ranks civil society on a scale from one to seven based on nine open-ended questions 
answered by experts. The ranking on the scale is originally determined by the author of an expert report 
and is then reviewed by outside readers and a board of academic advisors. Rankings are available for 
1995 and 1997-2013.33 
The Bertelsmann Transformation Index produces 49 scalar measures using expert opinion which 
are then compiled into a series of indices which gauge the extent to which the countries in question 
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have transformed into liberal democratic market systems. After a pilot study in 2003, it has been 
compiled biennially since 2006 for 129 developing and transitional countries. It has four indicators 
relevant to the study of civil society – organizational freedom, the presence of interest group networks, 
social self-organization, and a civil society tradition.34 
Last but not least, the International Institute of Social Studies in The Hague has created a set of 
Indicators of Social Development” (ISD) that measure aspects of civil society. They have compiled a civic 
participation indicator for 209 countries at five year intervals from 1990 to 2010. Seventeen percent of 
the observations are missing. It is compiled from a variety of answers to values and attitudes surveys, 
data on international non-governmental organizations, the Civicus CSI, and data on communications 
technology.35 The coverage of the sub-indicators is subject to a higher degree of missingness than the 
indicator itself. This problem is addressed through the use of percentile matching techniques rather 
than imputation.36 They have also compiled an indicator of “clubs and associations” from values and 
attitudes surveys. It is subject to a very high degree of missing observations – fifty-five percent.37 
Despite the valiant efforts of those who have sought to measure civil society prior to V-Dem, the 
paucity of data going back in time, limited coverage of countries, and the inconsistent coverage of the 
same factors, hinders both good descriptive inference about and the conclusive testing of general 
propositions on the impact of civil society. Such problems immediately raise issues of sample bias. Are 
the results of tests the product of the properties of the particular countries or time periods for which we 
have limited data? Even renowned datasets like the World Values Survey, which strive to provide data 
from many regions of the globe, often over-represents Western societies, other rich societies, or those 
with a strong state and statistical capacity, at the expense of poorer areas and those with poorer 
statistical infrastructure. Given the constraints they face on funding, what they have accomplished is 
remarkable, but its limits represent a potential problem in supporting generalizable propositions. 
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Problems of sample bias are also a concern in the case of some of the most innovative 
theoretical work on civil society. Take for example Sheri Berman’s brilliant account of how the Nazis 
were able to take control of highly developed civil society organizations in Weimar Germany and use 
them to take power.38 This is inference based on one, albeit highly influential, case. Similarly, Dylan Riley 
has also explored how civil society in the interwar period in Italy, Romania, and Spain constituted the 
“foundation of fascism.”39 Both authors argue that active civil societies unchecked by political 
organization are at the root of these democratic breakdowns. Both use thickly descriptive case analyses 
to convincingly demonstrate the causal links they theorize and for this reason the thesis they propound 
is influential. Yet at the same time, the theory is based on only four cases with no variation on the 
dependent variable. 
But is civil society really a threat to democracy? Were the aristocratic enemies of democracy 
that Tocqueville rejected correct in hindsight? Or does the problem of selection on the dependent 
variable require us to be much more cautious about generalizing on this basis despite compelling within- 
case evidence? Such questions are now answerable using the V-Dem data and two working papers from 
the V-Dem team show that on balance, civil society insulates democracies from breakdown. Bernhard, 
Hicken, Reenock and Lindberg, looking at a global sample from 1900 to 2010 show that civil society has a 
strong positive effect on democratic survival. 40  Cornell, Møller, and Skaaning directly look at the 
interwar period and find the same thing. 41 Both papers also show that the interaction of V-Dem civil 
society variables with the degree of political party institutionalization is also not significant, so they 
provide no global or interwar evidence that political party strength (as perhaps the best indicator 
available of political organization) plays any mediating role on the impact of civil society on the survival 
of democratic regimes. 
Thus V-Dem radically changes how we can study the impact of civil society on a range of 
outcomes. As noted above, and will be demonstrated below in our examination of the debate on civil 
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society in postcommunist Eurasia, the diversity of civil society indicators and their coverage allows us to 
approach old questions with new resources and confidence in our findings. And with time, it will allow 
for the testing of new hypotheses on the impact of civil society on political life. We next present the V- 
Dem civil society data in its full scope. 
The V-Dem Civil Society Data 
 
Like all civil society researchers, we conceive of civil society as an essential intermediary sphere 
of the polity. It lies in the public space between the private sphere and the official sphere of the state. It 
is not the only set of actors that lie within the non-official public sphere – it shares this space with 
political society, a set of public actors who are consciously organized to contest the control of state 
power. While civil society has a degree of autonomy from the state (ranging from extensive to minimal), 
civil society is still regulated by the state. The state establishes a framework for the operation of civil 
society, and often intervenes in its life (though the degree of freedom of civil society is enhanced by less 
intervention).42 
Civil society is populated by groups of citizens organized to act in pursuit of their interests, 
broadly conceived (both material and ideal). We refer to these groups of self-organized interested 
citizens as civil society organizations (CSOs). CSOs include, but are by no means limited to, interest 
groups, labor unions, religious organizations, foundations, think-tanks, social movements, professional 
associations, charities, and other non-governmental organizations. 
It is essential to distinguish between the public and private spheres in understanding what 
constitutes a civil society organization. Both routine spiritual and economic activity are not civic but 
private. The productive activity of firms is not part of civil society, nor is the spiritual activity housed in 
religious institutions. However, when producers, workers, or people who share a set of spiritually 
grounded, political, moral or ethical beliefs organize on the basis of a shared set of interests and pursue 
their realization in the public space, such activity is assuredly part of civil society. 
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The existence of civil society is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy. This 
means that civil society is compatible with both authoritarian and democratic political systems. Some 
forms of dictatorship, specifically those which enforce a monopoly on political and civil organization, 
abolish civil society. However, such harsh political projects, the sorts of dictatorships that have inspired 
the label “totalitarian,” as well as some forms of authoritarianism in their harsher phases, are less 
common than dictatorships that permit some level of civil society organization.43 
Despite a broadly shared and well-developed conceptualization of civil society in the 
comparative politics literature, it has been difficult and expensive to collect comparable data on it across 
societies and time periods. Unlike other political and social indicators (e.g. voting behavior, economic 
performance, coups d’état), it is not easily observable. Yet at the same time there is considerable 
knowledge about the state of civil society in the academic community. In that sense, the problem that V- 
Dem faced was to extract a form of hard to access embedded knowledge and make it widely available in 
a form researchers could use. The issue was to turn something hard to observe because it was the 
province of experts into a more generally accessible form of knowledge. 
The V-Dem dataset has compiled 350 separate indicators, seven different indices of 
democracy,44 and 39 mid-level indices of democracy (e.g. rule of law, clean elections, etc.) for 173 
sovereign states and territories for the period 1900 until today.45 Given the importance of civil society in 
recent theorizing about regimes and regime change and the difficulty in testing falsifiable hypotheses 
with a high degree of external validity, our aim was to produce both a series of disaggregated indicators 
that get at different aspects of civil society, as well as indices of civil society strength that cover a global 
sample of countries over an extensive period of time. 
The V-Dem response to digging out this broad range of new data was to rely on the in-depth 
knowledge embedded in responses from country experts to questions about fundamental 
characteristics of critical areas of democratic development for which it is difficult, prohibitively 
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expensive, or impossible to collect observational data. In the process over 2,500 country experts 
worldwide have contributed ratings to V-Dem.46 The country-expert data is combined into country-year 
estimates using a state-of-the-art Bayesian ordinal item-response theory model developed by the 
project’s methodologists.47 The V-Dem civil society battery has ten questions that gauge different 
disaggregated aspects of civil society. In our discussion we will highlight five questions that were 
essential in building the two indices that we highlight below and employ in our discussion of civil society 
in postcommunist Eurasia. In addition to those five questions, V-Dem also asked questions on the 
organizational characteristics of civil society organizations, the presence and character of anti-system 
movements, and whether religious organizations were subject to discrimination in civil society.48 
The test that we frame below to further demonstrate the utility and novelty of the V-Dem data 
on civil society will use two indices that gauge the strength of civil society in somewhat different ways. 
The first of these gauges is what we think of as civil society robustness, called the Core Civil Society 
Index (CCSI, v2xcs_ccsi). The second is a thick measure of the degree to which civil society participates in 
the political process, called the Civil Society Participation Index (CSPI, v2x_cspart). 
We think of the robustness of civil society in terms of its ability to organize free of state 
constraints and how engaged the citizenry is in CSOs. We aggregate three of our indicators designed to 
this end to construct the CCSI, which allows us to distinguish robust from feeble civil societies. State 
constraints on civil society come via two different mechanisms. States may use the law to regulate the 
entry and exit of CSOs into the public space, determining who can organize and who cannot. A second 
mechanism is the direct repression of organizations and activists. These two in combination with each 
other constitute the organizational environment created by the state for civil society. 
We capture these mechanisms using two questions from the civil society battery. The first 
concerns the control of CSO entry and exit by the state (v2cseeorgs). The experts were asked to assess 
state control of CSO entry and exit on a five-point scale from zero to four with zero representing 
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monopolistic control by the state authorities to 4 representing a lack of constraint. The second question 
concerned the level of state repression of CSOs (v2csreprss). Here the responses ran from zero to four 
with zero indicating active repression by the state to liquidate CSOs and four indicating substantively no 
government repression or harassment of CSOs. 
The degree of citizen involvement in CSOs is gauged by a third question on the participatory 
environment in civil society (v2csprtcpt). The experts were asked to rate individual country-years from 
zero to three, with zero capturing situations in which the state sponsors all organizations, thus 
effectively exercising a monopoly on organization as in many state socialist and state corporatist 
regimes. Its maximum value is three for those societies in which there are many diverse CSOs and 
citizens are at least occasionally active in them. 
The Civil Society Participation Index was designed to create a thicker indicator of the degree to 
which civil society organizations are engaged in the political process. It too uses the civil society 
participatory environment question discussed above but thickens it with three other V-Dem indicators. 
Two of these come from the civil society battery. The first was a question designed to gauge the extent 
to which rulers routinely consult with CSOs on policies relevant to their members (v2cscnsult). The 
experts were asked to rate each country-year according to a three-point scale which runs from zero to 
two. Zero is indicative of a high degree of insulation of the government from CSOs and two indicative of 
regular consultation with CSOs on relevant policy issues. One is indicative of an intermediate level of 
consultation.  This captures the extent to which civil society organizations are capable of translating 
their activism into impact at the level of policy. 
The second additional question from the V-Dem civil society battery examines whether women 
are prevented from engagement in civil society (v2csgender). This is a five-point scale that runs from 
“almost always” to “almost never.”49 Women’s participation is not only intrinsically interesting in itself, 
but also can function as an indicator of whether traditional status barriers are an impediment to 
13 
 
 
 
 
participation in civil society organizations in general. Finally, we also draw on one question from outside 
the civil society battery capturing the candidate nomination process within party organizations 
(v2pscnslnl). This indicator captures the extent to which candidate nomination is highly decentralized or 
made through party primaries.50 This item was included to gauge the extent of citizen and CSO 
participation in the process of representative government selection beyond voting, and therefore 
captures the extent to which civil society organizations are capable of translating their activism into 
influence on political society. 
While the two measures are strongly correlated (.91), they do tap into slightly different aspects 
of civil society.51 The CSPI is geared purely to capturing citizen and CSO participation and its 
effectiveness in conveying demands to the party system and state administration, while the CCSI also 
takes into account how state policy shapes citizen engagement. The latter controls for the effects of 
state harassment and legal regulation in facilitating or encouraging citizen participation. While such 
constraints are often minor in democracies, they are quite important under authoritarian conditions, 
especially in those cases in which the regime uses forms of democratic emulation as a means to secure 
compliance and shore up its rule. Such considerations are important in gauging civil society strength 
across countries both globally and in postcommunist Eurasia where we deploy them later in the article 
in our tests. 
Creating the V-Dem Civil Society Indices 
 
Up until this point we have discussed the importance of civil society as a concept of central 
importance in the study of democracy and democratization, and how we used a subset of questions 
from the V-Dem data to create indices of civil society strength. We now explain the technical details of 
how we tapped the rich vein of expert knowledge that allowed us to create the CCSI and CSPI to serve 
the needs of researchers looking for a single indicator that captures the relative strength of civil society 
across observations. 
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The construction of the indices was a two-step aggregation process. In the first stage, ordinal 
ratings provided by multiple country experts for the relevant variables are aggregated using a Bayesian 
measurement model. In the second stage, the output of these statistical models is aggregated into the 
indices using Bayesian factor analysis. The process by which this has been accomplished is highly 
transparent, for our civil society indicators and the dataset as a whole. The full codebook includes the 
complete battery given to the experts and details the fashion in which higher-order indices were 
aggregated.52 The process by which individual coder data was aggregated into latent variable estimates 
by the measurement model is all extensively documented and publicly available.53 Because latent 
variable estimates include a degree of uncertainty, full posterior distributions for all variables are 
publicly available to allow researchers to verify that their findings are not a product of measurement 
error.  We briefly review each stage of the construction of the civil society variables used here. 
Since country experts provided multiple ordinal ratings for each of the variables that constitute 
the indices,54 the first measurement challenge is to aggregate the ordinal ratings into a unified, 
continuous and reliable variable. Individual raters might vary with regard to the way they interpret the 
questions, and in terms of reliability and consistency. Thus, we utilize Bayesian item response theory 
models to aggregate their diverse ratings. These models are useful because they incorporate the 
information encoded in the variation in raters’ perceptions, and in reliability levels across and within 
coders into the estimation process.55 While this type of model has been widely used in political science 
to measure legislators’ ideology based on binary data,56 their use in aggregating multi-rater ordinal data 
is much less common.57 
The main assumption underlying item response theory is that the variable being measured is 
latent, i.e. cannot be measured directly, and that raters perceive the true value of the variable with 
some error. Importantly, the model utilizes coder ratings and patterns of disagreement across raters to 
estimate coder level errors, and down weights the ratings provided by coders who are deemed less 
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informative. The Bayesian framework allows us to estimate the country-year latent quantity of interest 
(e.g. the latent degree to which CSOs are harassed by the state in a given country-year), as well as 
simultaneously estimating the thresholds that separate the levels of the latent variable. Put differently, 
the model estimates country-year level parameters that capture the latent variable of interest, along 
with thresholds differentiating the various levels of this latent variable.58 
Expert surveys pose a problem for social scientists in terms of cross-national comparability. 
 
Coders who vary in terms of their educational and cultural backgrounds might have different 
perceptions of the latent variable, and may, in addition, have different latent thresholds.59  If these 
coders provide ratings for disjointed units, model estimates will be problematic since estimates for 
different countries will be based on different scales. In order to mitigate this problem, the V-Dem 
project has recruited a large number of bridge-coders, i.e. coders who serve as connecting units across 
previously disjointed countries. Extensive Monte Carlo simulations60 provide strong evidence that bridge 
coders indeed improve model fit and greatly increase the degree of cross-national comparability.61 
In the second stage of the index construction, we generate the index scores using Bayesian 
factor analysis. As before, utilizing the Bayesian framework is advantageous since it allows us to 
generate uncertainty estimates for the index. All component variables loaded highly on the latent 
dimension, though the factor loadings are somewhat higher for the CCSI than the CSPI.62 
In thinking about how to assure ourselves that the data generation process yielded valid 
indicators, we ran an extensive series of validity checks. In terms of macro-level face validity, we 
designed several basic tests that examined whether CCSI behaved in line with our expectations over 
large units of time and space. We also ran a series of discriminant validity checks that looked at the 
correlations between the CCSI and extant civil society indicators, as well as other measures that 
captured dimensions similar to its component parts. Finally, we also ran a series of convergent validity 
checks exploring the correlations between the CCSI and variables to which we thought it should have a 
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strong relationship. These exercises helped to build our confidence that the data was capturing the 
latent dimensions for which it was designed.63 We next report on a series of micro-level validity checks 
we ran to demonstrate how the data effectively capture detailed expert knowledge on national level 
civil societies and make it available to the research community at large. 
From Embedded to Transparent Knowledge 
 
Our argument on why the V-Dem civil society data is a unique and potentially game-changing 
development in the study of civil society is based on how it has taken an embedded and difficult to 
access body of knowledge and made it publically available to the research community at large. The 
difficulty of this challenge lies in the fact that there is no set of universally available observables over a 
broad range of times and places that allows us to access the development of civil society in a 
comparative perspective. Knowledge about civil society in national contexts is widespread, yet at the 
same time still difficult to access because it is only at the disposal of individual scholars who have made 
time-intensive commitments to studying the role of the citizenry in politics. 
V-Dem has been able to compile its range of civil society indicators over a substantial period of 
time for many countries by accessing that expert knowledge and standardizing it. By asking multiple 
experts on national contexts the same set of questions about different aspects of civil society we were 
able to compile a set of at least five expert assessments of different aspects of civil society at different 
places and times. The measurement model then takes those raw assessments and generates a latent 
variable estimate with confidence bounds that takes into account the different ways in which coders 
make their assessments of answers to the questions and how reliable their answers are in relation to the 
assessments given by the other coders. In this way the divergent assessments of coders across time and 
context are arrayed on the same scale, making geographic and temporal comparison possible. 
To demonstrate that this process provides data that extracts a credible assessment of the 
development of civil society at the level of individual nation states in line with the kinds of knowledge 
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possessed by country experts, we present the results of micro-level face validity checks we performed 
for the CCSI. Here we examine the extent to which the CCSI is congruent with the historical development 
of civil society in particular countries. We should observe change over time in line with particular events 
related to the constraints on CSOs and levels of mobilization. We chose to examine Venezuela, Ghana, 
and Russia based on the expertise of team members. 
Venezuela’s CCSI for the period 1900-2012 is displayed in Figure 1 below. It also includes the 
seventy percent Bayesian confidence intervals generated by the measurement model. The variation 
over time corresponds to three important periods. Before 1935, the country knew only military 
dictatorship, and civil society was tightly circumscribed. When General Gómez died in 1935, a series of 
transitional governments oversaw political liberalization, especially the growth of unions and political 
parties. This culminated in the Trienio of 1945-48, considered by many to be Venezuela’s first attempt at 
democracy. This period saw the rapid organization of peasant leagues and the expansion of professional 
associations. It was quashed by a military coup in 1948, leading the political opposition to go 
underground or into exile until a durable transition to democracy in 1958-59. This led to a period of 
great freedom for all sorts of civil society organizations, although they were heavily politicized along 
partisan lines. 
[Figure 1] 
 
The recent sharp decline corresponds to the government of Hugo Chávez Frías (1999-2013). The 
CCSI helps to illuminate this controversial period. Although his government repeatedly won elections 
and survived most referendums, civil society experienced many setbacks due to threats against union 
leaders, arrests of opposition politicians and judges, intimidation and harassment of NGOs and public 
employees, monitoring of political loyalties by governing-party officials and neighborhood activists, and 
progressive muffling of critical viewpoints in the media. Most of the change in the CCSI for Venezuela 
was due to two components: government attempts to repress CSOs (v2csreprss) and “moderate” 
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government control over the entry and exit of CSOs into public life (v2cseeorgs). The level of 
participation (v2csprtcpt) remained consistent (“There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement 
is minimal”) from 1959 to 2012. Venezuela saw growing CSO independence from parties in the early 
1990s and sporadic mass mobilizations in the 2000s, but not much strengthening of civil society 
organizations in this last period. 
Figure 2 presents Ghana’s CCSI over time. In the early twentieth century under British colonial 
rule, the moderate CCSI scores reflect that civil society organizations existed and operated with minimal 
interference as long as they did not challenge British rule. To that end the colonial authorities exercised 
a fair degree of control over which organizations were allowed to exist but otherwise were not unduly 
repressive nor did they particularly discourage participation in CSOs. The upward movement in the CCSI 
starting after World War II reflects an upsurge in activism due to the emergence of a broad-based 
national independence movement that succeeded in 1957. 
Soon after independence the new government under Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention 
People’s Party (CPP) called for national unity over pluralism and CSOs were subjected to increased levels 
of repression, including the infamous Preventive Detention Act in 1958 that gave the prime minister the 
power to detain individuals for up to five years without trial. Nkrumah, who was later declared president 
for life, tolerated no further political competition, and as Ghana became increasingly autocratic, civil 
society had less room to maneuver than even under colonial rule. This explains the sharp drop in the 
CCSI following independence. 
[Figure 2] 
 
We observe a positive change in the CCSI in 1967 following the military coup that overthrew 
Nkrumah in 1966, when the National Liberation Council took over and liberalized in anticipation of 
elections in 1969. This period of liberalization and fledgling democracy was terminated by another coup 
led by Lieutenant Colonel I. K. Acheampong in 1972. Continued stagnation and political gridlock led to 
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two additional military coups led by Flight Lieutenant J. J. Rawlings in 1979 and 1981. Following the 
latter, Rawlings ushered in a longer period of nationalist-socialist rule by the Provincial National Defense 
Council (PNDC). The CCSI accurately captures this period when the Rawlings regime actively repressed 
CSOs and imposed tight controls on their entry and exit. 
The CCSI grows rapidly starting in 1988-89 when the Rawlings regime opened up political and 
civilian space and elections to local district assemblies were rolled out. By 1991, protests and 
demonstrations were allowed more or less freely in Ghana, and civil society no longer feared repression 
from the Rawlings regime. The CCSI reflects this rapid improvement that came with democratization in 
1988 to 1992. Since then it has remained at high levels under Ghana’s new period of democratic 
stability. 
The CCSI for Russia (Tsarist, Soviet, and postcommunist) is presented in Figure 3. At the onset of 
the last century Tsarist Russia had a weakly developed civil society (reflected in a moderately low CCSI 
score) that left some latitude for organization by the nobility, the propertied, and professionals while 
denying it to workers, peasants, and minority nationalities. The CCSI improves slightly after the 
revolution of 1905 when a new constitution liberalized the rights of citizens to assemble and form 
associations. It then drops precipitously with the Revolution and Civil War period (1917-1921), when 
politics was highly chaotic and armed force ruled the day. 
[Figure 3] 
 
The institutionalization of Soviet rule in the 1920s kept the CCSI at very low levels for an 
extended period of time. Under the USSR, society was subjected to extensive etatization with the 
citizenry firmly under the control of state sponsored transmission belt organizations. Beginning with the 
liberalization period of Glasnost and Perestroika under Gorbachev we see a sharp upturn in the CCSI due 
to a relaxation of state repression and control over the organizational realm. This period saw an upsurge 
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in independent organizations, a marked increase in public demonstrations, protests, strikes and the like, 
and a relaxation of controls on public discourse. 
The upward trend continues after 1991 as the strength of civil society in Russia continued to 
grow in the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the onset of Yeltsin’s rule, stabilizing at 
its maximum level throughout the 1990s. The decline beginning in 2000 corresponds to Putin’s rule and 
his installation of a competitive authoritarian regime in Russia in which civil society activity has been 
increasingly subjected to the heavy hand of the state anew, but at levels not nearly as harsh as under 
Soviet rule. 
Having now documented to readers that we have successfully used the expert knowledge on 
which our variables and indices are based to present novel and comprehensive data on the 
development of national civil societies over time, we will now use them to examine a controversy in the 
literature on civil society. Among scholars of postcommunist democratization there has been a long and 
determined debate over the impact of the communist experience on civil society. On the one hand, a 
group of scholars has seen a weak civil society as a potential impediment to successful democratization, 
while another set of scholars have argued that this concern is overstated. 
How the V-Dem Data Can Contribute to Substantive Debates: Civil Society in the Postcommunist 
World 
 
Among those who agree on the relationship between civil society and democracy, there can be 
disagreements over the condition of civil society, and what this ultimately means for the fate of 
democracy. This is particularly manifest in the discussion of democratization in postcommunist Eastern 
and Central Europe. On the one side there are a group of observers who see postcommunist civil society 
as relatively weak compared to civil society in other regions,64 and those who argue that the extant ways 
of measuring civil society through values and attitudes surveys miss parts of the picture, notably a 
vibrant development of civil society in the period since 1989.65 Instead they pose alternative 
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measurement strategies based on directly observable indicators such as protest event coding, 
coordinated political activity by networks of CSOs, and the registration of new CSOs by the state. 
Thus while there is good substantive justification to be concerned about the status of civil 
society among those interested in the study of democracy and its fate, the postcommunist civil society 
legacy debate points out the difficulties of coming to definitive answers because of the relative paucity 
of data. In one sense the two sides of this debate have been talking past each other due to radically 
different data sources. The findings that civil society is relatively weak is often based on data drawn 
from the answers to questions on organizational joining behavior and propensity to protest drawn from 
global and regional value surveys and barometers. The contradictory position comes from event data 
coded from newspapers on CSO formation and activity. Rather than reiterate the potential pitfalls of 
both forms of data, we will examine what our indices, the CCSI and CSPI, say about the relative strength 
of civil society in various regions. 
We first examine the data for the region in a comparative descriptive perspective. Figure 4 
presents the development of the CCSI and CSPI in Western Europe, Latin America, the former East Bloc, 
and the former Soviet Union for the period 1900 to 2012. We have chosen Western Europe as a 
comparison as it is a neighboring region with a history of strong civil society development in a global 
perspective and Latin America as an area with a recent history of regional democratization. It is clear 
from the outset that civil society development in both postcommunist regions lagged substantially 
below Western Europe during the period up to 1989. For most of the interwar and Cold War period it 
also lagged, but less profoundly, below Latin America, another region with a strong history of 
dictatorship. So historically, there is certainly evidence of a weak civil society on average in the 
postcommunist countries, both before and during communism. 
[Figure 4] 
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In the period after 1989 the levels of both indicators in the former East Bloc and the former 
Soviet Union increase dramatically. As in the postcommunist regions, we see strong improvement with 
the recent global wave of democratization in Latin America, although starting about a decade earlier 
there in the mid-1970s. While the levels of the post-Soviet states lag behind the three others, those in 
the former East Bloc have come to exceed those of Latin America and are actually higher than all regions 
of the globe except for Western Europe and North America (not shown in the figure). Most notably for 
the debate on postcommunist civil society, the strong differences between the mean scores for the 
former Soviet Union and the former East Bloc following 1989 seems to belie the idea of a uniform 
postcommunist legacy. 
In the statistical tests that follow we estimate the levels of CCSI and CSPI taking into account 
regional location as well as two factors thought to affect the strength of civil society.66  The first of these 
is the existence of democracy itself and the second is the level of development. In this regard, our tests 
are very different from those which use micro-level data. In the most elaborate tests of that kind, the 
most important controls are also individual level (though some studies use multilevel models that 
incorporate national level data as well). Here we gauge how different regions are doing, controlling for 
their experience both in terms of economic and political development. Thus the work we present here is 
the first to engage in this debate at the macro-level. 
In Table 1 we estimate the strength of civil society based on the level of development,67 degree 
of democracy, and a series of regional dummies.68 We also include a lagged dependent variable with the 
expectation that where an observation was in terms of the development of civil society in the recent 
past will strongly condition where it is at time t. We use a time-series cross-sectional design using 
random effects because of our desire to understand regional differences on the strength of civil society. 
In this regard the kind of inference we are drawing is descriptive, not causal. We are not trying to gauge 
why countries have different levels of CCSI or CPSI but to gauge the extent to which postcommunist 
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countries are different from the rest of the regions in the world. Our sample is confined to the post-1989 
period,69 the focus of the debate on the strength of postcommunist civil society. The results are 
presented below in table 1. 
In controlling for democracy when the CCSI is the dependent variable it is essential to use a 
measure that does not explicitly use elements that might be partially captured by the CCSI, such as 
freedom of association. For that reason, our controls embody minimalist measures of democracy. We 
also control for different specifications of democracy. We examine both level of democracy and time 
spent under democracy. Thus for the quality of democracy models, we use the V-Dem Clean Elections 
Index (v2xel_frefair), which captures the extent that elections are free and fair and procedurally sound.70 
We believe that this measure proxies well for Schumpeter’s minimalist electoral notion of democracy.71 
We also run models to capture whether democracy has a developmental effect over time (assuming 
more time under democracy will allow civil society to potentially flourish). Because there is no 
theoretically justified cut-point to sort democratic from non-democratic practice using the Clean 
Elections Index, we use the binary coding by Boix, Miller and Rossato (2015) to estimate time spent 
under democracy. It too uses a minimalist, electoral specification of democracy. This allows us to control 
for the fact that when we compare the postcommunist regions to areas of the world that democratized 
earlier, we capture that they are earlier in the process of the development of a democratic civil society. 
Table 1 presents four sets of paired models. The first four use the CCSI and the second use the 
CSPI. In each quartet the two first models use a level specification of democracy and the second two use 
the developmental (time) specification. In the first model of each pair the inclusion of a dummy for the 
postcommunist states gauges whether postcommunist civil society is different from the rest of the 
sample. In the second model in each pair we include dummy variables for other world regions to gauge 
whether postcommunist civil society (the reference category) is more vibrant than in other regions. 
[Table 1] 
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For the most part the postcommunist dummy is insignificant and inconsistently signed. In model 
1.3, it is positive and significant, but the lack of robustness across the four models leads us to discount it. 
When we compare the postcommunist countries to other regions things are somewhat more 
interesting. Postcommunist civil society outperforms that of both the Middle East and North Africa in all 
four models and Asia in the two CCSI models. Sub-Saharan Africa is significant and positive for the two 
CSPI models, indicating a higher level of participation controlling for development and democracy. The 
significant findings on other regional dummies are highly inconsistent and sporadic. So in this first 
general test we find that the strength of postcommunist civil society is neither particularly strong nor 
weak in comparison to a global sample, and does relatively well compared to the Middle East and North 
Africa and Asia. 
Given what we have seen in the descriptive data above and a large range of research that shows 
differing postcommunist developmental trajectories between the countries of the former Soviet Union 
(FSU) and other postcommunist countries,72 we repeat our tests separating the FSU from former East 
Bloc countries (FEB).73 In table two we repeat our tests with a dummy for the FEB countries and treating 
them as the excluded category. 
[Table 2] 
 
Our results for the FEB countries are remarkably different than the previous set of regressions. 
The coefficient on the FEB regional dummy is consistently positive and significant, indicating that given 
the region’s economic and political development, civil society is highly developed from both the more 
structural perspective embedded in the Core Civil Society Index and the engagement perspective of the 
Civil Society Participation Index. It consistently outperforms the former Soviet Union, Asia, Oceania, the 
Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America. It even outperforms Western Europe and North 
America in three out of four tests. These results tell us that there is a great diversity among civil societies 
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in the postcommunist region. In that spirit, we now turn to our last set of regressions, this time using the 
FSU countries as the comparison group. 
Table three repeats out tests focusing on the subsample of postcommunist countries which 
were part of the FSU. The results for the FSU dummy diverge for the CCSI and CSPI. While all are 
negative only those for the latter are significant. This indicates that levels of civil society participation 
are consistently lower for the FSU countries than the rest of the global sample. In terms of the tests that 
compare the FSU to other regions, when we gauge the strength of civil society using the CCSI, only the 
FEB and Sub-Saharan Africa dummies are consistently significant and positive. For the other regions the 
results are insignificant or inconsistent. However, when we turn to the CSPI most regions outperform 
the FSU, including, again the FEB countries and Sub-Saharan Africa, Western Europe, Oceania, North 
America, and Latin America. 
[Table 3] 
 
We also ran a series of robustness estimations using the participatory environment variable 
common to both indicators. It largely confirms what we found here. The postcommunist dummy 
remains insignificant, and the only region that consistently performs better given its level of 
development and democracy is Sub-Saharan Africa. For the FEB countries the result is insignificant with 
level of democracy in the regression, but significant and positive for duration under democracy. With 
regard to other regions, the FEB countries consistently outperform the FSU countries, Asia, and Middle 
East and North Africa. Finally, for the regressions gauging civil society strength in the FSU the dummy is 
significant in both models with level of democracy and democratic duration. With regards to the other 
regions it is consistently weaker than the FEB countries, Western Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, North 
America, and Latin America. The full results of these models are available in the on-line appendix in 
Table A-4. 
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To sum up the results of this part of our investigation – the lack of findings for the 
postcommunist countries in general hides great differences among those countries that shared a 
communist past. The null findings in the first set of models highlight that it is difficult to generalize about 
postcommunist civil society. Instead what we see is a divide between those countries that were formerly 
part of the Soviet Bloc and those what were part of the Soviet Union.74 The former, when we control for 
their economic and political development, have had great success in building postcommunist civil 
societies. For the countries of the former Soviet Union, we can talk about a weak postcommunist civil 
society at least from the perspective of citizen and CSO participation. Thus we conclude that there is no 
uniform postcommunist malaise when it comes to civil society, but a set of two strongly diverging 
trajectories. 
While we do not have time or space here to investigate the reasons behind the divergence 
between the two regions, the extant literature on legacies does provide some clues as to why this may 
be the case. Kopstein and Reilly attribute differences in democratic quality across the region to a 
process of diffusion of Western norms to those areas more geographically proximate to the West.75 
Darden and Grzymala-Busse explain differences in democratic practice as a product of norms conveyed 
by education between states that experience independent statehood in the interwar and those which 
did not.76 Bernhard as well as Vachudová explain such differences in democratic performance via the 
engagement of opposition movements at the moment of extrication from communism.77 To the extent 
that these hypotheses conform to the spatial categories used in our regressions, they are plausible 
hypotheses and adjudicating between them must await a new round of testing. 
Conclusion:  The Gains of Making Embedded Knowledge Transparent 
 
Since the emergence of civil society as an important substantive factor in our understanding of 
processes of democratization and the political life of democracy, our ability to pursue our theoretical 
insights have suffered from a shortfall of comprehensive and comparable data that would allow us to 
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subject them to rigorous inferential testing to validate general knowledge about the effects of civil 
society. The problem was not that there was not widespread knowledge about civil society over a range 
of cases and time periods, but that the knowledge was maddeningly difficult to access. By using expert 
surveys and state of the art item response theory techniques, V-Dem has made this deeply embedded 
knowledge available to the larger the community of researchers over a range of indicators for the whole 
of the twentieth century and beyond. 
Beyond its deployment in new lines of research as either the outcome of interest or an 
important causal factor, the availability of the data will allow us to avoid two potential pitfalls in the 
future. Instead of using constrained samples to make inference, we now have a data-rich environment. 
Thus we can avoid the pitfalls of sample bias. We illustrated the utility of the data in this regard by 
contrasting the findings of new V-Dem research on civil society and democratic survival with the 
historical work on “bad” civil society in interwar Europe. We now have substantial reason to doubt that 
the findings with regard to a set of influential cases in interwar Europe hold for the interwar period in 
general and for a more extensive global sample. 
We can also see the importance of this in our testing of the proposition whether postcommunist 
civil society is weak. In that debate the two sides have largely argued past each other on the basis of 
different forms of data that did not provide comprehensive coverage of the region or the ability to 
definitively compare the region to the rest of the globe. We examined the question in a new perspective 
using different data and addressing the issue at a macro-level. Our results do not confirm either position 
fully. Instead we show that there is substantial variation across former postcommunist countries in 
terms of how civil society developed following the downfall of communism.78 The differences seem to 
group intra-regionally. We show a sharp divide between the former East Bloc countries which have 
rapidly developed in terms of civil society strength and those of the former Soviet Union which have 
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lagged. Thus, using the data, we were again able to shed new light on a major controversy in the 
literature. 
The second pitfall concerns omitted variable bias. In the future if researchers believe that civil 
society has substantial impact on outcomes of interest or that the status of civil society presents 
endogeneity concerns with regards to outcomes, there is now data to gauge different aspects of civil 
society as an independent variable or to control for it when trying to gauge the impact of other 
independent variables. Our findings on postcommunist civil society have important implications for the 
future investigation of questions concerning postcommunist politics with regard to omitted variable 
bias. One strong assumption about postcommunist politics is that the shared starting point of these 
countries makes it reasonable to think about them in a most similar systems research design framework. 
Such frameworks facilitate the problem of control. Our research shows that there is substantial variation 
across the postcommunist states in the development of civil society. This means that is not possible to 
assume that such states share the same legacy with regard to civil society. Thus future research into 
questions in which variation in civil society can function as a confounder need to take this diversity into 
account. This points out that the absence of data on civil society potentially has led in the past to 
omitted variable bias in estimating the effects of independent variables on outcomes. 
The gains provided by the V-Dem data are not limited to the academic community. By making 
civil society and other key factors relevant to the study of regimes and politics in general, practitioners in 
the policy community also have a new and powerful tool at their disposal. V-Dem has not only made its 
data available to the academic community but has put the data on-line in a form that is much more 
accessible through on-line graphing tools for the policy community, and its use in classrooms by 
educators at all levels (including versions in French, Spanish, Russian, and Arabic). It includes a variety of 
different graphs, drill-down features, and motion charts.79 
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By making embedded knowledge transparent the data allows practitioners to get a sense of 
what the collective judgement of experts on how different aspects of democracy have developed over 
time in specific contexts. One of the comparative advantages of V-Dem is that it is based on the 
collective judgement of several experts, whose reliability and consistency has been evaluated in 
comparison to other expert coders through the measurement model. In that sense the data is less liable 
to individual coder bias. When practitioners make use of the confidence levels on the estimates that V- 
Dem provides, it also provides a greater degree of transparency about the degree to which they should 
be skeptical of our assessments. Of course, such distillations of knowledge are not a substitute for 
practitioners developing their own in-depth understanding, but they can serve as an aid in making sense 
of the particular problems they would like to address. 
We close this piece with a consideration on forms of knowledge in political science. 
 
Varieties of Democracy is an unprecedentedly extensive and comprehensive undertaking in comparative 
politics. It is unique in the ways that it brings together two sides of comparative politics – the large-n 
cross-national and the in-depth country specific. By utilizing the resources of those with in-depth 
country knowledge, V-Dem has been able to provide indicators on arenas of democratic political life for 
which we had little or no data in the past. In this sense it has taken an underutilized and, lately for a 
good part of the discipline, an underappreciated resource and has created something unprecedented. 
Utilizing the collective effort of literally thousands of colleagues it has been able to compile indicators 
for important aspects of politics which until recently were seen as difficult to observe, if not 
unobservable, such as civil society. This accomplishment has been a product of both cutting edge 
quantitative methods and the commitment of many comparativists to deeply understanding specific 
countries and regions. It is thus critical, despite the vast leaps and bounds that the discipline has taken in 
terms of quantitative methods and data collection in the last two decades, to not lose track of the 
importance of the passion and commitment that individual comparativists bring to the study of specific 
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places. Without that store of knowledge, and its reproduction in future generations of scholars, our 
ability to undertake and successfully execute innovative data collection projects like V-Dem will not have 
be possible. That embedded knowledge is the basis on which V-Dem’s ability to make heretofore murky 
areas legible to a wider audience. 
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Table A-1: Pairwise Correlations between the Civil Society Participatory Environment, the Core Civil 
Society Index, and Civil Society Participation Index Indicators 
 
 v2csprtcpt v2xcs_ccsi v2x_cspart 
v2csprtcpt 1.0000   
v2xcs_ccsi 0.8468 1.0000  
v2x_cspart 0.8876 0.9068 1.0000 
 
 
Table A-2: Factor analysis scores for CSPI components 
 
Variable Loading Uniqueness 
v2cscnsult 0.84 0.24 
v2csprtcpt 0.81 0.31 
v2csgender 0.62 0.58 
v2pscnslnl 0.66 0.54 
 
10,000 MCMC iterations with 5,000 iterations as burn-in. Chains = 1, thin = 10. Examination of trace and posterior 
density plots provide evidence that the MCMC chain has reached its stationary distribution. 
 
 
Table A-3: Factor analysis scores for CCSI components 
 
Variable Loading Uniqueness 
v2cseeorgs 0.96 0.07 
v2csreprss 0.89 0.19 
v2csprtcpt 0.81 0.32 
 
15,000 MCMC iterations with 10,000 iterations as burn-in. Chains = 1, thin = 10. Examination of trace and posterior 
density plots provide evidence that the MCMC chain has reached its stationary distribution. 
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Table A-4: Relative Strength of Civil Society Participatory Environment Using Random Effects TSCS Regressions 
 
Model 
Reference Category 
Lagged DV 
 
Logged GDP/capita (Divided by 1000) 
Clean Election Index 
Decades of Democracy 
 
Regions 
Postcommunist Eurasia 
Former Soviet Union 
Former East Bloc 
Western Europe 
Asia 
Oceania 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Middle East/North Africa 
North America 
Latin America 
Constant 
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 
Postcommunist Fomer Eastern Bloc Former Soviet Union 
0.903  *** 0.893   *** 0.922   *** 0.910   *** 0.909  *** 0.894  *** 0.923  *** 0.908  *** 0.899  *** 0.894  *** 0.917  *** 0.908  *** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
-18.745 ** -1.969 -11.403 13.424 -20.626 ** -1.112 -16.882 * 12.432 -16.272 * -1.112 -5.514 12.432 
(9.215) (12.429) (10.060) (12.992) (8.781) (11.976) (9.162) (12.438) (9.479) (11.976) (9.815) (12.438) 
0.181  *** 0.166   ***   0.167  *** 0.148  ***   0.176  *** 0.148  ***   
(0.040) (0.042)   (0.039) (0.039)   (0.039) (0.039)   
  0.011   *** 0.005   0.013  *** 0.004   0.009  ** 0.004 
  (0.004) (0.004)   (0.004) (0.004)   (0.004) (0.004) 
-0.027  0.005          
(0.022)  (0.024)          
     -0.111   ***  -0.135   *** -0.080   ***  -0.070   **  
     (0.034)  (0.035) (0.029)  (0.030)  
    0.035  0.081  ***   0.111  ***  0.135  *** 
    (0.022)  (0.022)   (0.034)  (0.035) 
 0.067   **  0.049  0.014  -0.015  0.124  ***  0.120  *** 
 (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.042)  (0.043) 
 -0.013  -0.029  -0.073   *  -0.101   ***  0.038  0.034 
 (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.041)  (0.040) 
 0.018  -0.006  -0.035  -0.070  0.075  0.065 
 (0.041)  (0.046)  (0.042)  (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.051) 
 0.091   ***  0.070    **  0.029  -0.002  0.140  ***  0.133  *** 
 (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.037)  (0.036) 
 -0.042  -0.087   **  -0.105   ***  -0.160   ***  0.006  -0.025 
 (0.034)  (0.039)  (0.037)  (0.042)  (0.036)  (0.039) 
 0.073  0.047  0.017  -0.019  0.128   *  0.116   ** 
 (0.062)  (0.047)  (0.063)  (0.050)  (0.066)  (0.054) 
 0.017  0.021  -0.039  -0.049  0.072  **  0.086  ** 
 (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.035)  (0.036) 
0.176  *** 0.018 0.177   ** -0.023 0.187  *** 0.079 0.211  *** 0.057 0.164  ** -0.031 0.140  * -0.078 
(0.065) (0.105) (0.077) (0.113) (0.063) (0.102) (0.072) (0.108) (0.067) (0.102) (0.076) (0.106) 
Number of Observations 3038 3038 3011 3011 3038 3038 3011 3011 3038 3038 3011 3011 
Number of Countries 152 152 151 151 152 152 151 151 152 152 151 151 
Within R-Square 0.69 0.69 0.685 0.686 0.689 0.690 0.685 0.686 0.690 0.690 0.685 0.686 
Between R-Square 0.995 0.995 0.996 0.995 0.996 0.995 0.996 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 
Overall R-Square 0.956 0.956 0.956 0.956 0.956 0.957 0.956 0.956 0.956 0.957 0.956 0.956 
Two-tailed tests with robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
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Figure 1:  The Development of Civil Society in Venezuela, 1900-2012 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2:  The Development of Civil Society in Ghana, 1900-2012 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3:  The Development of Civil Society in Russia, 1900-2012 
  
 
 
Figure 4: CCSI and CSPI over Time in Four Selected Regions 
Table 1: Relative Strength of Postcommunist Civil Societies Using Random Effects TSCS Regressions 
 
 
 
Model 
DV 
1.1 
CCSI 
1.2 
CCSI 
1.3 
CCSI 
1.4 
CCSI 
1.5 
CSPI 
1.6 
CSPI 
1.7 
CSPI 
1.8 
CSPI 
Lagged DV 0.876  *** 0.854   *** 0.946   *** 0.927   *** 0.917  *** 0.898  *** 0.953  *** 0.938  *** 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.009) (0.011) 
Logged GDP/capita (Divided by 1000) -9.141  *** -1.948 -2.313 3.766 -5.944  *** -1.414 -2.488  * 2.366 
 (1.946) (2.850) (1.876) (2.918) (1.345) (2.004) (1.393) (2.075) 
Clean Election Index 0.081  *** 0.084    ***   0.046  *** 0.049  ***   
 (0.015) (0.015)   (0.009) (0.010)   
Decades of Democracy   0.001   * 0.000   0.001   ** 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Regions         
Postcommunist Eurasia 0.008  0.010   *  -0.002  0.002  
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.004)  
Western Europe  -0.009   *  -0.004  0.005  0.003 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Asia  -0.018   **  -0.016   **  -0.002  -0.005 
  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
Oceania  -0.013   **  -0.007  0.003  0.000 
  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.012  0.004  0.017   ***  0.010  * 
  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Middle East/North Africa  -0.030   ***  -0.032   ***  -0.011  *  -0.018  *** 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
North America  -0.010  -0.006  0.007  0.002 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Latin America  -0.006  -0.002  0.001  0.002 
  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Constant 0.125  *** 0.103    *** 0.064   *** 0.035 0.088  *** 0.056  *** 0.058  *** 0.029 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.014) (0.023) (0.013) (0.018) (0.011) (0.018) 
Number of Observations 3044 3044 3016 3016 3038 3038 3011 3011 
Number of Countries 152 152 151 151 152 152 151 151 
Within R-Square 0.684 0.685 0.672 0.672 0.724 0.724 0.714 0.715 
Between R-Square 0.994 0.993 0.997 0.996 0.997 0.996 0.997 0.997 
Overall R-Square 0.942 0.944 0.942 0.943 0.956 0.957 0.955 0.956 
Two-tailed tests with robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
Table 2: Relative Strength of Former East Bloc Civil Societies Using Random Effects TSCS Regressions 
 
 
 
Model 
DV 
2.1 
CCSI 
2.2 
CCSI 
2.3 
CCSI 
2.4 
CCSI 
2.5 
CSPI 
2.6 
CSPI 
2.7 
CSPI 
2.8 
CSPI 
Lagged DV 0.887  *** 0.863   *** 0.941   *** 0.921   *** 0.922   *** 0.899  *** 0.950  *** 0.931  *** 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.009) (0.012) 
Logged GDP/capita (Divided by 1000) -8.723  *** -1.813 -2.760 3.908 -6.060  *** -1.157 -3.391  *** 2.503 
 (1.844) (2.652) (1.894) (2.835) (1.292) (1.857) (1.283) (1.955) 
Clean Election Index 0.072  *** 0.074    ***   0.042  *** 0.045  ***   
 (0.014) (0.015)   (0.009) (0.009)   
Decades of Democracy   0.001   ** 0.000   0.002  *** 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Regions         
Former East Bloc 0.023  ***  0.028   ***  0.010  ***  0.017  ***  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.004)  
Former Soviet Union  -0.029   ***  -0.036   ***  -0.022  ***  -0.028  *** 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Western Europe  -0.024   ***  -0.021   ***  -0.006  -0.010  ** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Asia  -0.034   ***  -0.036   ***  -0.015  ***  -0.020  *** 
  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Oceania  -0.027   ***  -0.024   ***  -0.008  **  -0.013  ** 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.005  -0.015   **  0.005  -0.004 
  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
Middle East/North Africa  -0.045   ***  -0.053   ***  -0.023  ***  -0.034  *** 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
North America  -0.025   ***  -0.024   ***  -0.005  -0.011  ** 
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Latin America  -0.021   ***  -0.020   ***  -0.010  **  -0.012  ** 
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Constant 0.119  *** 0.099   *** 0.069   *** 0.057   *** 0.086  *** 0.068  *** 0.066  *** 0.046  *** 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.014) (0.022) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.017) 
Number of Observations 3044 3044 3016 3016 3038 3038 3011 3011 
Number of Countries 152 152 151 151 152 152 151 151 
Within R-Square 0.683 0.684 0.672 0.672 0.723 0.724 0.714 0.715 
Between R-Square 0.995 0.994 0.997 0.996 0.997 0.997 0.998 0.997 
Overall R-Square 0.943 0.944 0.942 0.943 0.956 0.957 0.956 0.956 
Two-tailed tests with robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
Table 3: Relative Strength of Former Soviet Union Civil Societies Using Random Effects TSCS Regressions 
 
 
 
Model 
DV 
3.1 
CCSI 
3.2 
CCSI 
3.3 
CCSI 
3.4 
CCSI 
3.5 
CSPI 
3.6 
CSPI 
3.7 
CSPI 
3.8 
CSPI 
Lagged DV 0.864  *** 0.863   *** 0.945   *** 0.921   *** 0.913  *** 0.899  *** 0.951  *** 0.931  *** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.009) (0.012) 
Logged GDP/capita (Divided by 1000) -8.280  *** -1.813 0.090 3.908 -5.455  *** -1.157 -1.167 2.503 
 (2.074) (2.652) (1.958) (2.835) (1.351) (1.857) (1.352) (1.955) 
Clean Election Index 0.085  *** 0.074   ***   0.045  *** 0.045  ***   
 (0.016) (0.015)   (0.009) (0.009)   
Decades of Democracy   0.000 0.000   0.001 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Regions         
Former Soviet Union -0.007  -0.009  -0.013  ***  -0.012  **  
 (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.005)  
Former East Bloc  0.029   ***  0.036   ***  0.022  ***  0.028    *** 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Western Europe  0.006  0.015  0.016  ***  0.017    *** 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Asia  -0.004  0.000  0.008  0.007 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Oceania  0.002  0.012  0.015  ***  0.015  ** 
  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.007) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.024   **  0.021   **  0.027   ***  0.024  *** 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Middle East/North Africa  -0.015  -0.017  -0.001  -0.006 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
North America  0.005  0.012  0.018  ***  0.017  *** 
  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Latin America  0.009  0.016  0.012   **  0.016  ** 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Constant 0.126  *** 0.070   *** 0.049   *** 0.022 0.087  *** 0.046  *** 0.051  *** 0.019 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.013) (0.021) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016) 
Number of Observations 3044 3044 3016 3016 3038 3038 3011 3011 
Number of Countries 152 152 151 151 152 152 151 151 
Within R-Square 0.685 0.684 0.672 0.672 0.724 0.724 0.714 0.715 
Between R-Square 0.993 0.994 0.997 0.996 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 
Overall R-Square 0.942 0.944 0.942 0.943 0.956 0.957 0.955 0.956 
Two-tailed tests with robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
